1 o be truly cost-effective, interventions must be not merely well targeted but also carefully designed to meet the specific needs of poor people. This means developing technologies suited to the risky environment that con fronts small farmers, devising credit schemes to serve small borrowers, combining feeding programs for especially vulnerable groups with educa tion on health, nutrition, and so on.
Commercial financial institutions designed and established specifically for the pur pose of lending to microentrepreneurs in developing economies and that are able to mobilise the necessary funds from markets on commercial terms would, if selfsustainable, meet the dual policy objectives of attacking poverty and engaging the private sector in doing so. By providing the right sort of financing, such institutions would help release the considerable potential of die poor for productive activity.
The Role of the Informal Sector
In most developing economies die poor undertake much of their economic activity in the informal sector, which provides diem widi bodi employment and the necessi ties of life. It makes sense, therefore, to direct programs designed to promote the productive use of die labour of die poor towards the informal sector. Not only do most productive enterprises operate in die informal sector, but jobs can be created in much larger numbers and at much lower cost dian in the formal sector. In the Philippines, for example, die Department ol Trade and Industry estimated in 1990 diat whereas it cost P224,000 in capital investment to create a job in the 'modem sector' (Medalla, 1990) , die programs of die Philippines non-government organisa tion I ulay sa Pag-unlad Inc. were diought to be creating on average one job for about every P I0,000 lent to microentrepreneurs. In Zimbabwe, at a conference on job creation held in Harare during 1994, die Ministry for Employment Creation, National Affairs and Cooperative Development estimated that in 1990 small-scale
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enterprises in the informal sector created jobs for only Z$4,000 of investment, while Z$75,000 was needed to create a job in the formal sector. (This is not to suggest that the ' jobs' created in the informal sector are substantially comparable to those created in the formal sector.)
Informal sectors are extremely important -yet frequendy overlooked -em ployers of labour and contributors to die nadonal product in developing economies. In Bolivia, it has been esdmated diat 5.2m people out of a population of 6.4m rely on die informal sector, which is said to generate about 30 per cent of the economy's GDP and supply 60 per cent of urban jobs and 90 per cent of rural jobs (PRODEM, 1993) . The World Bank (1990:63) estimates that the informal sector accounts for 75 per cent of urban employment in many economies in sub-Saharan Africa and 85 per cent in Pakistan. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1993:41) , in some Asian economies, including India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, wage employment in die urban informal sector has been growing faster than in die formal sector. In India, twice as many jobs have been created in the unorganised manufacturing sector compared with the organised. In Tanzania, die 'second economy' accounts for more than 40 per cent of GDP (Bagachawa & Nalio, 1994:20) . There is litde doubt that informal sectors play a significant role in most developing economies.
Characteristics of Microentrepreneurs and their Enterprises
The informal sectors of developing economies differ gready in their organisation, composition, productive capabilities and income structures. Nevertheless, the pat terns of activity widiin diem are remarkably similar. The 'firms' to be found in these sectors range from die individual sidewalk vendor and tenant farmer to quite substantial and advanced business undertakings diat employ many people and pro duce large volumes of goods and services. In most developing economies, such firms produce goods of all kinds, ranging from consumables for sale within the in formal economy itself to cash crops and consumer goods to supply the formal sec tor. Individuals and firms of informal sectors provide a comprehensive range of services for the day-to-day purposes of clients bodi widiin and beyond informal sec tors.
Microentrepreneurs and dicir enterprises likewise display considerable similar ity across developing economies.
• The vast majority of microentrepreneurs are poor.1
• They have very few assets -mosdy dieir own labour and the labour of those they can afford to hire, and possibly minimal pieces of capital equipment re quired to produce dieir particular wares or render dieir particular services.
See Remenyi (1991) tor a discussion ol die hierarchy ol poverty as it relates to this issue.
• They frequently operate outside die purview of government business regulation, sometimes intentionally (though they may be subject to some local official su pervision such as licensing, limitations on scope and nature of activities and formal and informal taxation arrangements).
• Their sources of finance are limited to their own savings or those of their fami lies and friends, or, where available, the informal sector money lenders who usually charge rates of interest considerably higher than those charged in the formal sector.
• They do not have acceptable forms of collateral to support borrowing from the formal banking system.
• Their financing requirements are usually relatively very small, entailing relatively high administration costs to their lenders.
• Initially, they require mainly working capital (to buy stock for work in progress), but if they are given die opportunity to grow they also require capital for plant and equipment.
• They are usually located in poorer urban communities.
Financing programs designed to meet the needs of such people and their business undertakings obviously need to take account of these characteristics.
Financial Markets and Informal Sectors
Most developing economies are served by banks and other financial institutions operating along relatively advanced lines. They tend to operate almost exclusively within the formal sector and to lend only to those clients who can meet their stan dards of security and accountability, which standards are usually adopted from fi nancial practices in industrial economies. One consequence of this is that financial intermediation in developing economies tends to divert the savings of the relatively poor into the activities of the relatively rich. In most developing economies, the businesses of the informal sector are ca tered for by a separate, informal financial system. The enterprises and individuals making up diese informal systems are largely eidier traders who extend credit to their clients on the basis of anticipated crop or odier production, or money lenders who specialise in extending secured or unsecured credit to those who cannot meet the formal system's standards. Typically, interest rates are much higher than those charged in the formal sector and security is guaranteed by often unsavoury means. An example of the sorts of credit terms available from informal lenders of the Philippines is die 5/6 system under which loans of five pesos made in the morning are to be repaid at six pesos at die close of business each day. One estimate suggested that, by 1990, 18 credit projects around the world were based on the Grameen Bank approach, supporting over 10,000 members (Getubig et al., 1993:40) . This number of projects can, however, be considerably expanded if a slighdy broader definition is adopted than diat based on the operational methods of the Grameen Bank. For example, die Opportunity Network -a voluntary as sociation of supporting NGOs in Australia, die United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and 42 autonomous implementing NGOs operating in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe -had a worldwide loan portfolio of over US$13m in 1993 dirough 42 partner agencies in 20 countries (Opportunity Trust, 1993) . And die World Council of Credit Unions reported diat at the end of 1989 there were more dian 17,000 credit unions in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, widi approximately 8.7m members. The annual microenterprise loan volume was estimated to be around US$200m (Otero & Rhyne, 1994:144) .
There is no available comprehensive survey of die number and location of the privately sponsored microenterprise financing programs found in developing economies. But die actual number of programs in operation probably runs world wide into the hundreds, if not diousands. Even so, in aggregate, they probably have only a relatively insignificant impact on die overall poverty situation, as most of them are very small, focusing as much on social service as on financial support.
The Effectiveness of Existing Microenterprise Financing Arrangements
The record of official and unofficial poverty credit programs is not particularly im pressive on the whole. Most poverty focused NGO credit programs share a num ber of features. They attempt to subsidise die credit receiver (that is, lend on con ditions much easier dian commercial terms); dicy tend to associate credit facilities with a range of relatively cosdy 'support services'; and diey have had to rely on grant or concessional funding from public subscription or sympathetic donor government programs for their continued existence. The vulnerability of these programs, as well as that of their members, to die uncertainties of public fund raising and the policy shifts of government donor agencies can be overcome in only one way: by putting them on so sound a commercial basis that diey can draw on money markets on commercial terms at will in order to sustain dieir lending programs. This means providing dieir services to members or clients on a full cost-recovery basis and op erating in a manner diat will ensure continued investor interest and financial market confidence -diat is, profitably.
The impact of lending on reasonable commercial terms on the business in come (and presumably also die living standards) of poor microentrepreneurs can be quite dramatic. One study undertaken by die Asian and Pacific Development Cen tre, and based on data of six Asian Grameen Bank replicators, indicates that returns on capital, labour and management of representative projects undertaken by bor rowers range from 23 per cent for die least profitable to 638 per cent for the most profitable (Getubig et al., 1993:63) . The increases in borrowers' household income generated by die same programs ranged from 33 per cent to 414 per cent, over three years (Getubig et al., 1993:65) . Other studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that such results are-not unusual.
Furthermore, supporters of such programs claim that they yield additional benefits. According to Getubig et al. (1993:64) , These include empowerment of the poor, especially the women, who begin to look at their groups and centres as a source of strength as they support one another in their struggle for survival, including assisting them in family conflicts or conflicts with other more powerful members of society. These groups also inculcate positive development values which are incorporated in the pledges that they make during their weekly meetings, or in their code of ethics . . . many of these decisions promote the value of education, sani tation, nutrition, health, family planning, and the practice of justice, disci pline and hard work.
It is important to bear in mind that these institutions are business enterprises, not welfare organisations. They simply cannot afford to provide services where the costs are not covered by those who utilise them. It is therefore necessary for such institutions to focus on those people and their businesses that have die capacity to utilise such finance productively and to service their debts on commercial terms but that do not have access, for a variety of reasons, to formal sources of finance. Commercial programs of this kind need, therefore, to focus specifically on the in formal sectors of developing economies and, within these, on active -or at least potential -microentrepreneurs.
A broader focus that includes die poor who do not have die capacity to use and support debt on commercial terms would, by definition, no longer be 'commercial' in nature, but welfare oriented. Poverty levels without such minimal capacity need other forms of assistance beyond the scope of commercial microenterprise financ ing.
Banco Solidario S.A.: Microenterprise Financing on a Commercial Scale in Bolivia 2
Banco Solidario S.A. (BancoSol) of Bolivia is possibly the best example of a fi nancially viable private-sector venture into microenterprise financing. It is a profit able commercial bank that is successfully raising funds on national and international money markets on commercial terms, for on-lending to poor microentrepreneurs.
BancoSol was created in 1986 by an NGO, Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarrollo de la MicroEmpresa (PRODEM). It began operations in Bolivia in February 1992 as a private commercial bank established specifically to provide fi nancial services to microenterprises in a developing country. Two banks supplying such services predate BancoSol -the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and Bank Rakyat Indonesia -but these are government-supported undertakings. At the end
This discussion of BancoSol draws on AgafonofT (1994).
of June 1994, BancoSol had about 57,000 client borrowers and a loan portfolio of almost US$27m, returning over 20 per cent on equity capital and 3 per cent on total assets. BancoSol is already operating profitably.
The Deputy General Manager of BancoSol is Hermann Krutzfeldt, SubGerente General, a professional Bolivian banker with many years of experience in North American and Bolivian commercial banking. He claims that BancoSol is in die final stages of transition from its NGO origins to a fully fledged commercial banking operation. Thus, enough has been achieved by BancoSol to provide a rea sonable basis for judgment on its future as a self-sufficient and profitable financial intermediary. The essential features of a possibly replicable model seem to be in place.
The bank's objectives are consistent with die Bolivian government's new eco nomic policy of encouraging private-sector development, including diat of die in formal sector. The government has recognised die considerable productive potendal of the informal sector, and understands die limitadons placed on its acdvides by die concentration of existing commercial banking services on die relatively (numerically) small formal-sector economic entities. The government is currendy reviewing laws and regulations pertaining to die financial sector in order to facilitate die creation of a wider range of credit institutions capable of catering to die financial needs of individuals and small business enterprises in Bolivia. It has been very in formally estimated diat these reforms could double die economy's private-sector credit base, currendy around US$2 billion.
The informal sector in Bolivia has grown very rapidly in recent years partly be cause of die migration of rural population to die cities, and partly because of die decline of employment opportunities in die mining industries diat have been se verely affected by declining commodity prices. One estimate is that 5.2m Bolivians rely for dieir livelihood on die informal sector. The same source suggests that 60 per cent of the economically active urban population is employed in the informal sector, and 90 per cent in rural areas, while die informal sector generates about 30 per cent of Bolivia's GDP (PRODEM, 1993) . The potential market in which Ban coSol and odier microcredit providers are operating in Bolivia has been roughly estimated at between 500,000 and 750,000 enterprises.
Reasons for BancoSol's Success
W hat has contributed to die success of BancoSol?
The first and most obvious factor is diat diere is an effective demand for its services, in terms of bodi market size and social attitudes. Microentrepreneurs are willing and able to take the necessary investment decisions to maintain and even develop their small enterprises. Such a venture might not succeed where markets are very small and very dispersed, or where social attitudes to commerce are not well developed.
Second, official policies are at least permissive of such undertakings. The authorities seem to recognise the need for the services being provided, are willing to make the necessary adjustments to regulations to accommodate the process, and are even considering encouraging the development of a wider range of financial in stitutions catering for small and micro business enterprises. The criticism that bu reaucratic intervention and delays make it difficult to establish new institutions is often well taken; at die same time, there is need to have regard for processes that ensure financial prudence and client security. An associated factor in BancoSol's success is die very polidcally influential nature of the members of die Board of Di rectors.
Third, die Bolivian government has adopted a set of macroeconomic policies diat facilitate die process. The reforms of 1985 (designed by die first President of BancoSol, Fernando Romero Moreno, as the then Minister for Planning and Co ordination) and die subsequent move to an open economy, including notably die liberalising of foreign-exchange markets, have enabled die private sector -even die informal one -to move ahead confidendy in developing business undertakings, and have given foreign investors (including NGOs interested in fostering small business) freedom and confidence to move capital into die country in pursuit of dieir legitimate business activities. It is doubtful diat BancoSol would have achieved its success had macroeconomic policies been inimical to die free How of capital into and out of Bolivia. The open economy enables BancoSol to lend and borrow freely in US dollars, diereby considerably reducing die problems of managing for die effects of domestic inflation.
Fourth, die bank has uncompromisingly adopted and applied sound commer cial standards to its activities. BancoSol, and PRODEM before it, have not suc cumbed to die temptation of feeding die poor for short-term relief; radier, they have enabled die poor to help diemselves in a disciplined and commercially fair way. O f course, die target group is not die absolutely poor, but diose who have al ready demonstrated a minimum capacity for attempting to help themselves. Nor does die bank devote any effort to the kind of cosdy 'technical assistance' and 'training' of its borrowers diat is provided by die traditional NGO approach.
Fifdi, die bank had a head start by being able to acquire a ready-made, estab lished portiolio of loans from PRODEM. PRODEM had, over five years of pio neering effort, developed lending practices appropriate to die market it served, and conditioned borrowers to die 'solidarity group' lending arrangements (a technique designed to overcome die target clients' inability to provide collateral in support of borrowing from die formal sector). A BancoSol might have been able to start from scratch, but shareholders would have had to wait for any returns on dieir investment considerably longer dian diey will have to now.
Finally, die bank is succeeding because it is completely professional in its ap proach to die business of banking. It has high professional standards of manage-ment, and an obviously highly motivated staff, who are recruited on merit and trained in the conduct of the business of the bank. The institution displays none of die well-meaning amateurism that is sometimes seen in non-banks undertaking similar activities in other places; even at the shop-front agencies, business is con ducted briskly and efficiently. Nevertheless, there is no lack of vision and idealism among staff members, supported no doubt by the obvious success with which the institution is pursuing its goals in a new, receptive and challenging market.
There seems to be no reason why, in developing countries where such condi tions are found, similar institutions should not establish and thrive. To improve chances of success, however, it might be necessary to build, where possible, on an established NGO base of activity that has effectively mobilised a critical mass of cli ent borrowers and already introduced the market to the concept of disciplined bor rowing on commercial terms.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Efforts have been made in a number of developing economies, primarily in the area of rural credit, to engage existing banks and other institutions of the formal sector in providing credit to the poor. The Foundation for Development Cooperation (1992) has developed proposals for the systematic involvement of formal banking institutions, supported by NGOs, in lending to the poor.
The research undertaken in this case has been concerned with an alternative approach -the creation of specialist commercial banking institutions -and sug gests die following conclusions. First, BancoSol appears to provide a successful model for a commercial bank specialising in microenterprise financing and would be worth replicating if, and where, the political, economic and social environment is conducive to its successful implementation. Second, while it might be possible to set up such banks from the outset, investors are likely to regard the area as high risk; a better road to success may therefore be for NGOs to work directly in their communities with poor microentrepreneurs, and develop the necessary critical mass ol clients required to ensure the financial viability of new banks.
1 he sources of funds for the formative stages of such projects are the traditional ones: public subscriptions, national official and multilateral aid agencies, especially international financial institutions (IFIs). Organisations involved in establishing mi croenterprise financing NGOs are experienced in raising funds by public subscrip tion and through national official aid agencies -the latter showing increased inter est in such enterprises over recent years. Funding support from IFIs would help the program to high levels of achievement.
Many proposals for new enterprises would no doubt emerge if the World Bank and/or regional banks were to announce policies and financial arrangements sup porting the development of microenterprise financial facilities on a private com mercial basis. The real problem for die providers of funds dien would be to ensure diat funds are used effectively, efficiendy, reliably and for die purposes specified. 1 his is a continuing problem in development assistance programs generally, and can be overcome by dealing widi reputable agencies diat have a good record and by undertaking projects based on well thought-through development plans. It is im portant that such plans cover the formative NGO and commercial bank stages, with strong commitment from implementing agencies.
One possible consequence of these conclusions is that resources currently be ing channelled into potentially bankable microenterprise development will be avail able to concentrate on areas of poverty that may, with die additional effort, also be come bankable. This study, considered against the basic policy objective, suggests possible lines of action that might facilitate the flow of commercial money from the private (formal and informal) sectors to informal sectors of developing economies through newly created banks. A possible subsequent effect might be that, through the demonstration of their commercial success, such specialist banks may encour age imitation by financial institutions not primarily concerned with development assistance, thereby adding to the flow of commercial resources into the informal sector. This, after all, is one of the important aims of economic development.
